Declaratory Judgments in Maryland by Case, Richard W.
Maryland Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 3 Article 3
Declaratory Judgments in Maryland
Richard W. Case
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard W. Case, Declaratory Judgments in Maryland , 6 Md. L. Rev. 221 (1942)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol6/iss3/3
Comments and Casenotes
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN MARYLAND
By RiCHARD W. CASE*
What has happened to the Maryland version of the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act?' A casual examina-
tion of the Annotated Code will reveal that Article 31A is
still very much in evidence. Unfortunately, however, its
presence in the Code is not determinative of the value of
the Act to Maryland law and procedure. To determine
this value, consideration must be given to a series of recent
Court of Appeals decisions, which, it is submitted, have so
diluted the natural strength of the Act that what remains
is merely a fragment of the original piece of useful and
necessary legislation. It is the purpose of this comment,
therefore, to point out the intended scope of the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act, and to analyze the recent
Maryland cases which have so materially restricted that
scope.
The Declaratory Judgment Act was passed to give
parties in interest a procedure by which courts of record
could determine their corresponding rights, status, or legal
relations in a simple manner not possible under existing
legal remedies. The judgment thus obtained differs mate-
rially from those obtained in other ordinary actions in law
or equity, since under a Declaratory Judgment as such, no
coercive or executory relief is asked. Judgments giving
only declaratory relief are far from new. Courts from time
immemorial have entertained actions such as bills quia
timet, bills of peace, bills of interpleader, bills for the per-
petuation of testimony, bills for the rescission of written
instruments, and annulment of marriage. In all of those
procedures, the courts have recognized the necessity for
passing judgments which determine right and status, which
make clear existing doubts as to legal position, but which
* Chairman, 1941-42, Student Editorial Board, Maryland Law Review.
"Md. Code (1939) Art. 31a. While this comment is devoted primarily
to the Maryland version of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, yet
the readers' attention is called to the somewhat similar fate which befell
the earlier Maryland statute providing for declaratory judgments in
equity, passed in 1888, and not specifically repealed by the enactment of
the Uniform Act. This statute, with the cases decided under it, can be
found in Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Secs. 29-35. Particular attention
should be called to the last case under the older statute, Saunders v. The
Roland Park Co., 174 Md. 188, 198 A. 269 (1938).
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do not attempt to coerce the defendant into a particular
course of action.'
Visualizing the utility of such peaceful procedures as
opposed to the ordinary coercive actions, the framers of
the Declaratory Judgments Act sought to extend this social
and legal philosophy into broader fields. The result was
the Uniform Act as it appears, with slight variations,' in
the Annotated Code of Maryland.
Section 12 of the Uniform Act provides that "This Act
is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and
to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with re-
spect to rights, status and other legal relations; and [it]
is to be liberally construed and administered."
Professor Borchard has described the three principal
groups of cases which are appropriately brought for de-
claratory judgments, and the advantages of declaratory
relief in these cases. The advantages in each group are
stated by him as follows:'
"(1) The substitution of a less technical, speedier,
cheaper and more civilized joinder of issue in types of
cases heretofore associated with hostile combat, the
encrusted technicalities of special writs and irrevoca-
bly broken economic relations. The declaratory action
proceeds on the assumption that a mild remedy will
often satisfy, that responsible defendants, like govern-
ment officials or large corporations, do not need more
than a declaration of the law to obey it and that a
coercive procedure under such circumstances is an
expensive and often unnecessary luxury.
"(2) Aside from the substitution of a more civilized
method of submitting disputes to judicial determina-
tion, the declaratory action has enabled the courts to
pass on new types of cases which heretofore predi-
cated adjudication on prior violence or destruction of
the status quo. Thus, on the assumption that most
people would observe the law if they could obtain an
authoritative interpretation or construction of their
'For a more extended comment on judgments giving no coercive relief,
see BOROHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (2d Ed. 1941) 6-7.
'But for one exception the Maryland version of the Act is word for
word with the Uniform Act. In Section 1 of Article 31A, an additional
clause, not found in the Uniform Act, appears. It reads "nor shall the
existence of another adequate remedy preclude a judgment for declaratory
relief in cases where it is appropriate." The importance of this addition
will be discussed at another point in this comment.
IBorchard, Declaratory Judgments (1939) 9 Brook. L. Rev. 1-2.
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obligations, it has permitted a contract, franchise, stat-
ute, or other instrument to be construed before breach
and without the necessity of destroying economic and
social relations, as is now generally the case. Con-
tracts, such as long-term leases, affected as never
before by new events, such as legislation, change of
circumstances or party act, may thus be kept alive
while in litigation instead of requiring a purported
breach or repudiation as a condition of judicial cogni-
zance of the dispute.
"(3) The procedure has enabled a party who is
challenged, threatened or endangered in the enjoy-
ment of what he claims to be his rights, to initiate the
proceedings against his tormentor and remove the
cloud by an authoritative determination of the plain-
tiff's legal right, privilege and immunity and the de-
fendant's absence of right, and disability. Corre-
sponding to an ancient remedy of the Roman law, as
reflected in the ceremonial of matrimony, it compels
the challenger to come forward, prove his claim or
ever thereafter remain silent. Thrown into jeopardy
and danger by the threat or attack, the party charged
has a legal interest in removing the cloud on his rights.
This type of case, sometimes conveniently called the
negative form of declaratory judgment, has attracted
the widest attention because of the novelty of the fact
situations presented to the courts. Both the second
and the third types are designed to remove uncer-
tainty and doubt from disputed legal relations and by
clarifying and stabilizing them to perform the valu-
able social function of promoting security."
In passing the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, a
legislature gives to the litigant a twofold method of pro-
cedure. First, a party is afforded a remedy in contro-
versies where the ordinary drastic action has not yet ac-
crued.5 In so doing, an attempt is made to give to parties
a method of procedure by which their existing legal rela-
tions may be determined before the status quo has been
broken, and where, for this reason no "ordinary" action
would lie. Secondly, if the status quo has been breached,
the act gives to parties who might have resorted to ordi-
nary actions at law or equity a more expeditious and less
5Md, Code (1939) Art. 31a, Sec. 3.
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violent form of action by declaration. In either case,
however, procedure under the act substitutes, in the ap-
propriate situation, a simple, efficient, and often amicable
method for adjudicating disputed jural relations in place
of the ordinary bellicose actions at law or in equity, which
imply a breach of economic and social relations and are
encumbered by procedural barnacles incidental to suit by
ancient writs.
The act, as outlined above, is used to adjudicate affirma-
tive relief. But its scope does not end there, for relief by
declaration may also be utilized in a negative form. In
seeking a declaratory judgment as a means of negation,
the litigant has a new and useful method to determine a
privilege or immunity, and, at the same time, to establish
defendant's "no right" or disability. A simple case situa-
tion can illustrate this point. A may obtain a declaratory
judgment which will determine that he owes B nothing,
or A may obtain a judgment determining that B has no
right to assert an easement across his ground. In neither
case is it essential that B shall have been guilty of overt
acts which would give A an affirmative cause of action; by
means of a Declaratory Judgment his rights and status
can be settled.
Before declaratory judgment procedure can properly
be used within the intendment of the Act as usually inter-
preted, it is necessary that certain conditions or pre-
requisites be fulfilled. It must be shown that there exists
an actual controversy between petitioner and his adver-
sary, that the issues are "ripe", that each has a sufficient
legal interest, and that there is a justiciable issue.
To be properly before the court, a plaintiff must show
more than that he has some uncertain status or right to be
established. He must show that the action is adversary in
character, and "that there is a controversy between plain-
tiff and defendant subject to the court's jurisdiction".8
Failing to show such an "actual controversy", the plain-
tiff's petition will be dismissed on the ground that he is
asking the court either for an advisory opinion, or bringing
before it a "moot case"2
I Md. Code (1939) Art. 31a, Sec. 3.
7 For a more complete discussion, see Borchard, The Declaratory Judg-
ment (1918) 28 Yale L. J. 1, 8-10.
'BoRcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (2d Ed. 1941) 29.
'For a full discussion on the requirement that the plaintiff must present
an actual controversy before he may secure declaratory relief, see Schroth,
The "Actual Controversy" In Declaratory Judgments (1934) 20 Corn.
L. Q. 1.
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When the facts of a case are uncertain or contingent,
when they require "judicial guess work", or when the is-
sues are so related to the future that no immediate conflict
of interests can be visualized, the courts will refuse a De-
claratory Judgment. In such cases there is no "ripeness of
issue". The plaintiff must be able to show, therefore, that
the facts indicate an immediate danger to him or inevitable
litigation against him before the courts will act. In other
words "the danger of the plaintiff must be present, not
contingent on the happening of hypothetical future
events". 10 A simple illustration is in point. A asks for a
declaration of his rights "if, as, and when" he pays off the
mortgage of B, the mortgagor, to C the mortgagee. 1 A's
bill will be dismissed because the issues are not ripe.
Before a plaintiff can secure a declaratory judgment, he
must show that he has a protectible personal or money.
interest at stake, which is being threatened by the defend-
ant. A plaintiff cannot have a statute declared unconsti-
tutional, therefore, unless he can show that the statute af-
fects his "legal interest". 2 Nor can a declaratory judg-
ment be secured to deny the validity of a zoning ordinance,
unless the plaintiff can show that his property or property
interest was thereby damaged.' 3  It must be realized,
however, that the concept "legal interest" is nebulous and
capable of wide judicial interpretation. Professor Bor-
chard contends that the Declaratory Judgments Act has
widened the scope of the concept, since a far greater num-
ber of moral and economic interests are now, by judicial
judgments, converted into protectible legal interests.'4
Granting that a plaintiff can show an actual controversy,
the ripeness of the issue, and sufficient legal interest, he
must also show that the case is justiciable before he can
secure a declaratory judgment. If he presents a case which
would require the court to assume the duties of the legis-
lative or executive departments of the government, or of
an administrative agency; or, if he petitions the court to de-
cide abstract political questions, the plaintiff will be denied
relief because he has presented no justiciable issue. At all
events, the plaintiff must show that he brings before the
10 BORCHARD, Op. Cit. 8upra, n. 8, 56.
11 See Heller v. Shapiro, 208 Wis. 310, 242 N. W. 174 (1932), noted (1932)
8 Wis. L. Rev. 81.
12 See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911) for a leading case
defining "legal interest".1 Weigand v. City of Wichita, 118 Kan. 265, 234 P. 978 (1925).
24 BORCHARD, op. cit. supra, n. 8, 49.
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court an actual "case" or "controversy" as defined by the
Supreme Court in many of its decisions. 5
Declaratory judgments have at times been confused
with cases calling for advisory opinions or "moot cases",
and care must be taken to distinguish these essentially
different situations. Cases calling for advisory opinions
are those in which the plaintiff has no such interest that
would justify judicial determination, or the parties defend-
ant are so inadequate that no judgment rendered would
be sufficiently conclusive. The judgment sought in an ad-
visory opinion does not constitute specific relief to a liti-
gant or affect his legal relations, but rather aids adminis-
trative or legislative authorities either in determining the
validity of proposed legislation or the interpretation of
laws already enacted.16 Judgments obtained under ad-
visory opinions are not binding on any party, and cannot
be "res judicata" in any case.17
A "moot case" is one in which the issues have become
"fictitious, colorable, hypothetical, abstract, academic, or
dead."18  There is no actual controversy in such cases, and
decisions rendered therein are binding on no one. They
are therefore essentially different in every respect from
situations calling for a Declaratory Judgment.
The scope and purpose of the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act have had widespread appeal since its intro-
duction into this country in 1919. Since that time the Act,
with moderate variations, has been adopted into Federal
procedure 9 and by 39 states.20 Maryland adopted the Uni-
form Act in 1939, with the variation that, in its second
sentence, the Maryland version adds to the uniform termi-
nology: "nor shall the existence of another adequate rem-
edy preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases
"I Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U. S.
716 (1929) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 (1937).
16 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911); Gordon v. United
States, 117 U. S. 697 (1885).
17 See Clovis and Updegraff, Advisory Opinions (1928) 13 Iowa L. R. 188.
18 BORCHARD, op. cit. supra, n. 8, 81-82.
29 28 U. S. C. A. 400.
20 Either the Uniform Act as such, or its substantial likeness has been
adopted in Alabama, 1935; Arizona, 1927; California, 1921; Colorado, 1923;
Connecticut, 1915; Florida, 1919; Idaho, 1933; Indiana, 1927; Kansas, 1921;
Kentucky, 1922; Maryland, 1939; Massachusetts, 1929; Michigan, 1929;
Minnesota, 1933; Missouri, 1935; Montana, 1935; Nebraska, 1929; New
Hampshire, 1929; New Jersey, 1924; New Mexico, 1925; New York, 1920;
North Carolina, 1931; North Dakota, 1923; Ohio, 1633; Oregon, 1927;
Pennsylvania, 1923; Rhode Island, 1923; South Carolina, 1922; South
Dakota, 1925; Tennessee, 1923; Utah, 1925; Vermont, 1931; Virginia,
1922; Washington, 1935; Wisconsin, 1927; Wyoming, 1923. Maine and
West Virginia also adbpted it in 1941.
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where it is appropriate".21 Since it became law, the act
has been a vehicle of procedure for eleven cases which have
come before the Court of Appeals. It is the purpose of the
comment to analyze those cases, discussing initially those
instances in which relief was obtained in suits brought
under the Act.22
The first Maryland case to be brought under Article 31A
was Levy v. Dundalk Co.23  There, the plaintiff, the pur-
chaser of a piece of property, proposed to erect a building
in violation of an equitable servitude claimed by the de-
fendant. The Court sustained the plaintiff's position that
such a servitude could not run in gross, and therefore
ordered the cause remanded for a declaratory decree in
conformity with the conclusions reached. The case is an
illustration of those situations in which negative relief is
sought, for here the petition was to establish an immunity
on the part of the plaintiff and a "no right" on the part of
the defendant. That the Act has particular utility in
cases like Levy v. Dundalk Co. is easily demonstrated by
the manifest hardship of requiring the plaintiff to breach
the status quo and then be forced to restore it under a deci-
sion upholding the equitable servitude,24 as would have
been the case under traditional procedures.
Two other cases in which relief was granted under the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act deal with the law of
contracts. In the first,25 the defendant notified the plain-
tiff that it considered certain acts of the plaintiff as amount-
ing to a breach of a contract existing between them. Upon
receipt of this notice, plaintiff sought a declaratory judg-
ment in order to determine the parties' actual legal rela-
tions under the instrument. The court found that the
notice of breach was inoperative and of no effect, and then
determined the rights of the parties under the contract.
The case illustrates how the Act may be used to defeat a
defendant's efforts to terminate a contractual relation, or
to preclude him from bringing a suit for damages because
of an alleged breach. The petition in effect asks for both
21 Supra, n. 3. That this clause has been completely ignored by the
Court of Appeals is evident from an analysis of the cases decided under
the Act. Maryland cases that are guilty of this omission are discussed at
another point in this comment.
"The technical wording of this sentence should be especially observed,
because in each instance in which relief was obtained under the Act, de-
fendant below made no objection to the method of procedure used.
23 177 Md. 636, 11 A. (2d) 476 (1940).
24 Had plaintiff been able to resort to a bill quia timet he would still
have been seeking declaratory relief, as discussed above.
2"American Weekly v. Patterson, 16 A. (2d) 912 (1940).
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affirmative and negative relief, in that it asks that plain-
tiff's status be determined, and that defendant has "no
right" to treat the contract as broken. In National Union
Mortgage Corporation v. Potomac Consolidated Debenture
Corporation,26 plaintiff, on behalf of various bondholders,
sought to have a subsection of certain debenture agree-
ments construed. The rights of the parties were fully de-
termined, and neither the parties concerned nor the court
raised any objection to the Act as an appropriate method
of procedure.
In two other cases brought under the Act, the Court
of Appeals reached its decision without approving or con-
demning the procedure. In Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord
Baltimore Candy and Tobacco Co.,2 7 the plaintiff peti-
tioned under the Act to have a Maryland Fair Trade stat-
ute declared unconstitutional. Plaintiff also asked that
his status and rights be declared under the statute if it
should be declared valid. A demurrer to the bill was sus-
tained by the Court of Appeals, but no mention was made
in the course of Judge Mitchell's opinion of the propriety
of the Act as a method of procedure for obtaining the relief
asked. It is becoming customary, however, in states which
have passed the Uniform Act to use this simple method of
procedure to test the constitutionality of ordinances and
statutes.28  It is submitted that Maryland is in line with
those jurisdictions, for in Baltimore v. Perrin,29 the Act
was used to determine the constitutionality of statutes,
and in the alternative the proper construction and applica-
tion thereof.
Oursler v. Tawes ° raised a constitutional law question
by means of the Declaratory Judgments Act. There, the
plaintiff sought to have the State Income Tax Law8 ' de-
clared unconstitutional. The Court granted the relief
prayed, since it reached the conclusion that one section of
2616 A. (2d) 866 (1940).
27 178 Md. 38, 12 A. (2d) 201 (1940).
21 BORCHARD, op. cit. supra, n. 8, 780.
11 In Baltimore v. Perrin, 178 Md. 101, 12 A. (2d) 261 (1940) the Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore petitioned for a declaratory judgment to
determine the constitutionality and in the alternative the proper construc-
tion and application of Sec. 183 of Article 56 of the 1939 Code, which re-
quired payment of personal taxes by residents of Baltimore City as a pre-
requisite to the registration of motor vehicles. The Court decided that the
statute was valid, and that it required the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
to refuse registration of cars for a particular year unless personal taxes
were paid. The Court did not discuss the method of procedure, e. g., under
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.
80178 Md. 471, 13 A. (2d) 763 (1940).
81 Md. Laws 1939, Ch. 277, Sec. 12.
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the statute was void but in all other respects the Act was
valid. In commenting on the form of procedure, the court
said:
"No issue has been raised as to the form of pro-
cedure, nor is there any controversy as to the facts in-
volved in the two cases. As has been indicated, there-
fore, the basic question submitted by both of said cases
centers around the constitutionality of Ch. 277 of the
Acts of 1939 in so far as the same is designed to impose
a tax on incomes in this state. '3 2
It is possible to imply from this language that if an objec-
tion had been made to the procedure, the Court would have
sustained it. It is submitted, however, that this is not the
rule elsewhere, and should not be adopted here.
The most recent case to come before the Court of Ap-
peals that sought a declaratory judgment is Hart v. The
Mercantile Trust Co.s 2a In that case, decedent's children,
specific legatees under his will, had entered into a compro-
mise agreement with the residuary legatee, a corporation,
under which the former assigned all their rights and inter-
ests under the will to the latter, and in return, the corpora-
tion had agreed to assign half of the net estate to the spe-
cific legatees. Upon a threat of payment to the Register
of Wills of an inheritance tax amounting to seven and a
half per cent., the rate paid by collaterals instead of the
usual one per cent., the amount paid by children of the de-
ceased, petitioners filed a bill for a declaratory judgment
to determine the correct rate of taxation. The Court found
that the specific legatees should be considered as the dis-
tributees of the portion passing to them, and that the rate
of taxation should be one per cent. No question was
raised as to the method of procedure used. The case is an
excellent illustration, however, of a situation in which a
declaratory judgment can be used to establish rights and
settled issues before the status quo has been broken.-b
31 Supra, n. 30, 478.
3-- 23 A. (2d) 682 (Md., 1942). See infra, circa, n. 65 for discussion of
a case in which declaratory relief was denied in a tax case.
31bAn even more recent case, decided after this comment had been set
in type, in which declaratory relief was used without discussion of or
objection to its propriety was Maryland Theatrical Corporation v. Bren-
nan, 24 A. (2d) 911 (Md. 1942), where a statute was declared unconsti-
tutional on a bill filed in an equity court. Without citing Article 31a, the
opinion stated "the appellant is entitled to a decree so declaring," and
later referred to the proper decree to be entered as a "declaratory
decree".
1942]
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The Maryland cases analyzed above raise no objection
to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act as a method
of procedure. Unfortunately, however, those cases do not
constitute all the decisions in this state which have at-
tempted to construe the scope of the Act, and, it is sub-
mitted, the four cases next to be analyzed have gravely
impaired the utility and operation of the Uniform Act.
In Porcelain Enamel & Manufacturing Co. v. Jeffrey
Co. 3 3 the plaintiff made application to a court of law for a
declaratory judgment to determine which of two con-
tractors with the plaintiff had caused a delay, and therefore
which might be held by the plaintiff in an action for dam-
ages. In effect, therefore, the plaintiff sought a declara-
tion as to which of the two contracting parties had been
guilty of a breach of contract. The Act specifically pro-
vides that a party may have his rights and status under a
contract determined, and that such construction may take
place either before or after breach. 4 The Court reviewed
decisions of two jurisdictions 5 and then stated that in such
situations as the instant case there was no settled interpre-
tation of the Act, and that therefore the Court would apply
its own judgment in ascertaining the meaning of the stat-
ute. In denying relief to the plaintiff the Court said:
"So confining it, the decision is that the Legislature
cannot be supposed to have meant that resort to a
declaratory judgment should take the place of an ordi-
nary action for damages for breach of contract because
information is lacking to the Plaintiff. The name 'de-
claratory judgment' and the subject of its 'rights,, status,
and other legal relations', would, in our opinion signify
rather that uncertainty in the contract and its effect
is to be removed. '36
The decision is unfortunate. Plaintiff asked that the con-
tracts be construed and that the rights, duties, and obliga-
tions of the parties be outlined in a declaratory judgment.
The Maryland Statute clearly gives him a right to ask this.
The weight of authority elsewhere clearly sustains his posi-
tion. 7 It is submitted that the construction of the statute
is therefore erroneous.
as 177 Md. 677, 11 A. (2d) 480 (1940).
"Md. Code (1939) Art. 31a, Secs. 2, 3.
"5 California and Tennessee.
Supra, n. 33, 681.
BOUCHARD, op. cit. supra, n. 8, 499 et 8eq. In this chapter on Contracts,
Professor Borchard points out the possibility of the interpretation of con-
tracts under a declaratory judgment either before or after breach. In
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The case which struck a serious blow to the Maryland
Uniform Act was Caroline Street Permanent Building As-
sociation v. Sohn.18 In that case a mortgagee sought to
have a paper writing construed, which purported to give
to the defendant certain real estate owned by plaintiff's
mortgagor. It was the theory of plaintiff's case that the
"agreement" was an attempt by the mortgagors to divest
themselves of valuable security to the detriment of the
mortgagee. The Court denied relief,"9 stating that "where
there exists an immediate cause of action between the
parties for which one of the common remedies of law or
equity is adequate and available, a proceeding for a de-
claratory judgment is not appropriate within the scope of
the Act. '40
The effect of this decision is obvious. It completely
nullifies one of the main purposes of the Act, e. g., to give a
party a more expeditious and less violent means of pro-
cedure where the status quo has already been broken.
Moreover, recourse to the remedy is discouraged by the
fear that the Court will conclude, although in direct defi-
ance of the Act which sought to forestall this precise error,
that there is another remedy available.4
The Court of Appeals cited twelve jurisdictions in sup-
port of its views in the Caroline Street case.,2 It is sub-
mitted that the majority of these jurisdictions do not sup-
port the Maryland view, or that the cases cited have no
application to the case at hand.
In Ohio, the question of whether the Declaratory Judg-
ments Act is an alternative remedy has twice been before
the courts.43 Both cases are cited by the Maryland Court
of Appeals as answering this question in the negative. In
such cases either affirmative or negative relief may be granted, and at all
events parties' status may be determined thereunder. Can it be possible
that the Court of Appeals, in the principal case, has denied to Maryland
citizens this form of relief, especially in the light of the fact that it was
specifically given to them under Sec. 3 of Art. 31a?
"8 178 Md. 434, 13 A. (2d) 616 (1940).
89 In denying declaratory relief, the Court found that the correct pro-
cedure would have been in a creditor's bill.
40 Supra, n. 38, 444-445.
" For a similar criticism of a case supporting the Caroline case, see
Glasser, The Declaratory Judgment as an Alternative Remedy in Ohio
(1937) 4 Ohio State L. Jour. 1, 19.
"These include New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio,
Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Virginia, California,
and England.
4s Investment Co. v. Ohio Citizens Trust Co., 55 Ohio App. 1, 8 N. E. (2d)
470 (1937) ; Schaefer v. First National Bank of Findlay, 134 Ohio St. 511,
18 N. E. (2d) 263 (1938).
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the first case," a lower court held that a lessor who be-
lieved that a lease was forfeited could not have such an in-
strument construed under a declaratory judgment, since
he could obtain the same relief in an action in ejectment.
The case was immediately the point of justified criticism."
In the later case," the Ohio Supreme Court changed this
when it held that the validity of a note, depending on lack
of consideration, could be determined under the Uniform
Act even although the plaintiff might have availed himself
of other remedies. The court clearly held, therefore, that
the Act was an alternative remedy, and that it could be
utilized notwithstanding that another remedy was avail-
able.
American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Kushner,4 7 from
Virginia, is cited as authority in support of the Caroline
case. But, in the Virginia case, plaintiff was granted the
relief sought under Declaratory Judgment procedure, and
therefore any remarks concerning the Act's not providing
an alternative remedy were mere dictum. When the ques-
tion was squarely raised in Virginia, howevcer, the Court
said:
"The fact that a plaintiff might by the institution
of an action or suit or series of actions or suits, eventu-
ally through protracted and continuous litigation, have
determined the same questions that may be determined
once and for all in a declaratory judgment proceed-
ing, has never, so far as we find, been held by the
courts to deprive the courts of juridiction to enter a
declaratory judgment wherein the entire rights of the
parties can be determined and settled once and for
all.,48
It is evident, therefore, that the Virginia Court does not
support the Maryland position.
There is dictum in the Nebraska case of Stewart v. Her-
ten 9 which supports the view of the Maryland Court in
the Caroline case. There, the constitution of Nebraska
gave original jurisdiction over the appointment of guard-
ians to the county courts, and the Supreme Court held that
11 Investment Co. v. Ohio Citizens Trust Co., 55 Ohio App. 1, 8 N. E. (2d)
470 (1937).
45 Supra, n. 41.
48 Schaefer v. First National Bank of Findlay, 134 Ohio St. 511, 18 N. E.
(2d) 263 (1938).
1' 162 Va. 378, 174 S. E. 777 (1934).
I' Chick v. MacBain, 157 Va. 60, 66; 160 S. E. 214, 216 (1931).
'9 125 Neb. 210, 249 N. W. 552 (1933).
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this precluded the district court from passing a declaratory
judgment removing one guardian and appointing his suc-
cessor. The case is correct on this narrow point. The
dictum to the effect that the Act is not an alternative rem-
edy was not necessary in deciding the case however, and
has been characterized as "gratuitous, inaccurate, and mis-
leading surplusage." 50  It has not been followed in Ne-
braska.
The Indiana case of Brindley v. Meara51 is cited by the
Court of Appeals to sustain its position. In that case a
declaratory judgment had already been obtained, and
plaintiff endeavored to secure "further relief" as outlined
in the Act. The Court held that the provision for "further
relief" was unconstitutional, since it was broader in scope
than the title of the Act. The case is not in point with the
Caroline case, and is no authority for the position there
taken . 2  Wisconsin and New Jersey cases cited by the
Maryland Court are not in point and have no relation to
the question presented in the Caroline case.53
Further to support the Caroline case, the Court of Ap-
peals cited cases from Pennsylvania and the general laws
of England as authority for its position. Early in the
history of the Act in Pennsylvania, the courts of that state
fell into the error of suggesting that the Declaratory Judg-
ments Act could only be used when no ordinary form of
action was available. 4 Unlike Maryland, however, the
courts of Pennsylvania have the protection of a poorly
50 BORCHARD, op. cit. 8upra, n. 8, 335.
51209 Ind. 144, 198 N. E. 301 (1935).
"The Indiana case has been the object of criticism in a note in (1936)
22 Va. L. Rev. 588.
"In Heller v. Shapiro, 208 Wis. 310, 242 N. W. 174 (1932) the plaintiff
had been required to make payments on a loan secured by a mortgage on
certain property. To prevent foreclosure, plaintiff sought a declaration
of his right to subrogation in the position of the paid off mortgagee "if,
as, and when the mortgage was paid off". The court held that the issues
were not sufficiently ripe to allow adjudication and therefore dismissed
plaintiff's bill. Also see Springdale Corp., et al., v. Fidelity Union Trust
Co., 121 N. J. L. 536, 3 A. (2d) 565 (1939) where plaintiff's petition was
apparently dismissed because he had sought relief at law and his place was
rightfully in equity. Neither of these cases deal with the declaratory
judgment as an alternative remedy.
1, See List's Estate, 283 Pa. 255, 129 A. 64 (1925). The theory of the
Pennsylvania decisions denying relief was, in part, that the declaratory
judgment was in the nature of an extraordinary remedy, to be granted
only when there was no other available legal or equitable remedy. Such
grounds were especially evident in decisions before the Pennsylvania Act
was amended in 1935. There is no historical justification for such reason-
ing, nor can any be found in the Act itself. An extended comment on this
same subject is found in Borchard, Declaratory Judgment8 in Pennsylvania
(1934) 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 317.
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worded statute which allows them wide latitude in the in-
terpretation thereof.55 There is no disagreement among
the authorities that in England, the declaratory judgment
is an alternative and not an exclusive remedy. 0 As a re-
sult, neither of these jurisdictions can be said to support
the Maryland decision.
A leading case in New York which stands for the propo-
sition that the Declaratory Judgments Act is not the proper
procedure where other actions are available is James v.
Alderton Dock Yards.7 In that case defendant agreed
with the plaintiff to pay him a fair commission if plaintiff
could sell defendant's business. Compensation to the plain-
tiff was not to be made, however, until defendant received
all the proceeds from the sale. Not satisfied with the com-
mission offered, plaintiff petitioned for a declaratory judg-
ment before defendant had received all the proceeds of
the sale. The court held that plaintiff should have waited
until defendant had received the full sale price and then
brought an ordinary action for breach of contract. Stand-
ing alone, this case supports the Caroline case. However,
the case is easily distinguished from it, and later New York
authority is exactly contrary to the Caroline case. In New
York, rule 212 of their local Rules of Civil Practice pro-
vides that if in the opinion of the Court the parties should
be left to relief by existing forms of action, it can de-
cline to pronounce a declaratory judgment. There is no
such provision in the Maryland Act. On the contrary,
Section 1 of Article 31A of the Code provides, by way of
addition to the uniform version, "nor shall the existence
of another adequate remedy preclude a judgment for de-
claratory relief.""8
It is submitted that if cases of other jurisdictions are to
be regarded as persuasive authority in Maryland, they
should be cases decided under statutes substantially similar
to the Maryland Act. Neither the statute in Pennsylvania
"5 Laws 1935, Art. 97, 228.
50See Jennings, Declaratory Judgments Against Public Authorities in
England (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 407, and Comment, The Declaratory Action
As An Alternative Remedy (1927) 36 Yale L. J. 403.
.7256 N. Y. 298, 176 N. . 401 (1931).
"' That New York supports the view that declaratory relief may be had
even although there exists another adequate remedy at law or equity, is
brought out in Woollard v. Schaffer Stores Co., 272 N. Y. 304, 5 N. E. (2d)
829. The court said: "We have never gone so far as to hold that, when
there exists a genuine controversy requiring judicial determination, the
Supreme Court is bound, solely for the reason that another remedy is
available, to refuse to exercise the power conferred by Sec. 473 and rule
212."
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nor the practice in New York can be said to be thus similar.
On the contrary, the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act,
when read in conjunction with Federal Rule 57,59 is prac-
tically identical with the Maryland statute. In determin-
ing whether the Federal Act offered an alternative remedy
to the litigant, Judge Parker, speaking at a time before the
even more pointed terminology of Federal Rule 57 had
come into the picture, said, in Stephenson v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society:60
"And that the remedy provided was intended as an
alternative one in cases where other remedies are
available is shown by the provision of the first para-
graph that such judgments may be rendered whether
or not further relief is or could be prayed."' '
The result of this investigation is obvious. The Court
of Appeals, in deciding the Caroline case, put Maryland
with the infinitesimal minority that holds the Declaratory
Judgments Act is not available as an alternative remedy.
The cases referred to by the Court to support its position,
particularly when contrasted with the overwhelming num-
ber of cases the other way,62 do not represent such author-
ity as should deprive the citizens of Maryland of such a
valuable piece of legislative reform as the Declaratory
Judgments Act.
The two remaining Maryland cases raise the problem of
whether declaratory relief should be denied when there
are special tribunals designated to try the facts in contro-
versy. In Morgan v. Deitrich,63 the plaintiff filed a peti-
tion for a declaratory judgment to determine the effect of
an agreement executed by one W upon an alleged codicil
to his mother's will. The Court of Appeals denied declara-
tory relief, stating:
"A sufficient answer to those arguments would
seem to be that the Orphans' Court for Harford County
is the only tribunal vested with jurisdiction to order
the probate or rejection of the paper writing alleged
" It is evident that the departure from Uniform Act terminology in the
Maryland Act was styled after the wording in Rule 57. The Federal Rule
states in part: "The existence of another adequate remedy does not pre-
clude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate."
This sentence should be compared with the clause quoted from the Mary-
land Act, supra, n. 3.
6092 F. (2d) 406 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
61 Ibid.
61 BORCHARD, Op. cit. supra, n. 8, 315-346.
6316 A. (2d) 916 (1940).
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to be a third codicil to the will of Mrs. W and that the
Circuit Court of Baltimore City has neither original
nor concurrent jurisdiction with the Orphans' Court
in admitting or refusing to admit the instrument to
probate. 64
Confined to the narrow point of appropriate tribunals, the
decision is probably correct, but unfortunately the Court
reviews both the Porcelain Enamel case and the Caroline
case with approval. As a result, the Morgan case must be
considered a drawback to progressive procedure in Mary-
land.
In Williams v. Tawes,65 the plaintiff sought to have part
of the Maryland Income Tax statute declared unconstitu-
tional, and failing in this, she sought to have her status de-
termined thereunder.6 6 Pointing out that the same legisla-
ture which had passed the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act had also vested the Comptroller and/or the State Tax
Commission with jurisdiction over such cases, the Court
held that that of itself was sufficient to show that Article
31A could not be used in situations of this character.66a
Where a tribunal is vested by the legislature with special
jurisdiction in certain named cases, it is reasonable to be-
lieve that such tribunal should have exclusive jurisdiction.
But, it is doubtful, at best, if this case on its facts falls
within an appropriate application of the rule. Certainly,
there is no reason for referring the question of constitu-
tionality of the tax to the administrative official or board.
To attempt a prediction of the future of the Declara-
tory Judgments Act in Maryland would be to participate
in a legal guessing game. On the strength of the Mary-
land decisions, however, it is evident that where the status
quo has been broken, and thus where an ordinary action
at law or equity is available, no relief by declaration can
be obtained. Declaratory relief will probably be granted,
on the other hand, where the status quo has not been
broken but where doubts as to status arise from legal rela-
tions which are to be continued in the future. Neither
6
' Ibid., 918.
6517 A. (2d) 137 (1941).
"6The plaintiff claimed that Sec. 244 (a) of Article 81 did not apply to
income from a foreign fiduciary trustee, but if income were taxable it
should be treated as "ordinary" income, as to which she was not taxable
at more than 2 %.
66, See supra, circa, notes 30-32a for discussion of cases where declaratory
relief was granted in tax cases, where no contest was made as to the
propriety of such relief.
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of these situations, however, covers the majority of cases
in which the Act normally would be used. When the
status quo has clearly been broken, plaintiff, in the major-
ity of cases, will want executory relief rather than relief
by declaration.
The great majority of cases which should come under
the Declaratory Judgments Act are those in which the
parties are in doubt as to the existence of the status quo.
They seek, therefore, to have it determined, and if the
court should find it changed, they seek to have their new
status declared. Nowhere is this point illustrated more
clearly than in Maryland litigation involving domestic rela-
tions, both concerning the validity of marriages and the
recognition of divorces granted in the courts of other
States. Aside from declaratory judgment procedure, the
existing picture of this scene is a dismal one, consisting of
overlapping and confusing procedures for some purposes,
and doubtful or non-existent ones for others. Liberal use
of declaratory procedure, apparently now impossible under
the Caroline Street ruling would have improved the situa-
tion immeasurably in this regard. 67
It is obvious that if the Maryland Court should find the
status quo changed, i. e., a contract broken, a tenant wrong-
fully holding over, or a right of action accrued, it would
say on authority of the Caroline case that plaintiff has a
complete and adequate remedy at law or equity and there-
fore deny relief. The result is that, contrary to the terms
of the Act, the Court has closed its doors to a considerable
number of cases which were meant to be adjudicated by
declaratory procedure and are so adjudicated in other
states and in the federal courts.
It is difficult to see why the Court of Appeals should
have so limited the scope of the Act. The great majority
of states, as pointed out above, have reached the conclusion
that the act is an alternative and not an exclusive remedy,
and that therefore the existence of another remedy at law
or equity is no reason at all to deny relief by declaration.
These decisions have been based on the Uniform Act. The
Maryland Act, however, departs from the wording of the
Uniform Act in that the Maryland Act specifically states
67 With reference to the confusion presently existent in Maryland do-
mestic relations procedure, see Comment, The Confusing Maryland Do-
mestic Relations Procedures (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 275. For mention of the
possibility of using declaratory judgment methods, see Ibid., 279-280, notes
17 and 18; and Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriages in Maryland and
Their Annulment (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 252-256.
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that the existence of another adequate remedy will not pre-
clude a judgment for declaratory relief.68 The result is,
therefore, that not only does the Court depart from the
weight of authority elsewhere, but also it ignores an at-
tempted codification of that authority into the Act by the
Maryland Legislature. It is submitted that where the
legislative intent is so strongly averred, it should not be
so lightly dismissed.
The legislature could, as has been done in the past,69
repeal and re-enact the statute, including therein a pre-
amble which would leave no doubt as to the correct inter-
pretation of the Act. It is also possible that the Court
could adopt a rule of reason whereby a plaintiff would only
be denied relief if it reasonably appeared that his rights
would be better served in an ordinary action in law or
equity.
The view in the Caroline case can and should be
changed. If it is not, Maryland citizens will be forced to
continue using antagonistic and quarrelsome remedies, in-
stead of employing a peaceful and amicable method of pro-
cedure, better adapted to the purposes of justice. It is pos-
sible that the benefits sought under the Act will be be-
stowed upon the people of Maryland in some way not sug-
gested here. This, however, is of little significance. The
important end to be attained is to see that ultimately the
beneficial progress and practical usefulness of the Act is
restored to Maryland procedure.
POWER TO MODIFY OVERDUE INSTALLMENTS
OF ALIMONY
Winkel v. Winkel'
The wife instituted suit for separate maintenance or
alimony. The trial court awarded her a set weekly amount
until further order of the court, beginning from the time
that the wife should convey certain property to the hus-
band. The conveyance was not obtained until several years
later, and the husband made no payments during that
time. Subsequent to this, the husband did not pay the
weekly amounts but did pay the wife a weekly rental for
the use of certain of her property, which rental was in
68 Supra, n. 2, 59.
69 Md. Code (1939) Art. 9, See. 33. See the preamble and declaration of
Legislative intent as found thereunder.
1 178 Md. 489, 15 A. (2d) 914 (1940).
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